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Abstract
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement
over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability or a suggestion within
Bayesianism. I argue that Sober’s criterion entails that if one group of people is
justified in believing a claim, every group is, and that it tacitly relies on an inconsistent
interpretation of probabilistic inequalities. Furthermore, the criterion’s restrictions on
the use of auxiliary assumptions are in part redundant and in part unjustified. Most
importantly, they are so weak that almost all theories can be contrastively tested. On
the basis of these results, I suggest a modification of Sober’s criterion that avoids these
problems without abandoning Sober’s core idea.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, Elliott Sober (1990; 1999; 2007; 2008) has developed and
defended a criterion of empirical significance, called ‘testability’, that is both promising and
much needed. The promise stems from Sober’s defense of the criterion’s basic assumptions
and the fact that it can deal with probabilistic theories and auxiliary assumptions. The
need for a criterion of empirical significance stems from, for example, questions about
the empirical significance of string theory (Smolin 2006; Woit 2006), scientific realism
(Sober 1990), theism (Diamond and Litzenburg 1975; Martin 1990, §2), and the theory
of intelligent design (ID), to which Sober (1999; 2007; 2008) applies his criterion. Given
the possible applications of a criterion of empirical significance and the simultaneous
wide-spread belief that the search for such a criterion has utterly failed (cf. Soames 2003,
ch. 13), it is somewhat surprising that Sober’s criterion has not been subjected to much
scrutiny—all the more so because Sober’s treatment of ID is widely discussed.1 This article
is meant to fill this gap.
To this end, I briefly discuss two criteria of empirical significance whose problems
Sober’s criterion is meant to avoid, namely falsifiability (§2.1) and a Bayesian definition
of empirical significance (§2.2). To arrive at a precise and consistent definition of Sober’s
criterion, I discuss its implications, some of them unwanted (§3.1), and develop an inter-
pretation of inequalities between possibly undefined probabilities that arguably follows
from Sober’s assumptions (§3.2). Then, I will argue that one of the criterion’s restrictions
on auxiliary assumptions is problematic (§4.1) and, more importantly, that the other one
is not sufficient to avoid a trivialization of the criterion (§4.2). In light of these problems,
I suggest two modified versions of Sober’s criterion, a relative one that is provably non-
trivial, and an absolute one to which the trivialization proof for Sober’s criterion does not
apply (§4.3).
2 Two criteria of empirical significance and their problems
Sober (2008, 154) conjectures that his criterion is “a step forward from the failed proposals
of the logical positivists”, but this is misleading because the logical positivists wanted to
distinguish between meaningful and meaningless sentences (cf. Carnap 1963, §6.A). Sober
(2010, 1), on the other hand, does not consider his definition of testability to provide a
criterion of empirical significance precisely because “ ‘[e]mpirical significance’ suggests
1The only discussion that does not exclusively focus on the criterion’s application to ID might be given by
Justus (2010) in a book review.
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that a sequence of terms has meaning iff it is empirically testable”, a position to which
he does not subscribe. Rather, Sober (2008, 149f) argues, meaningfulness is a semantic
concept, while testability is epistemic. And furthermore:
It seems clear that meaningfulness and testability are different. I suppose that
the sentence “undetectable angels exist” is untestable, but the sentence is not
meaningless gibberish. We know what it says, what logical relations it bears
to other statements, and we can discuss whether it is knowable; none of this
would be possible if the string of words literally made no sense.
Therefore Sober is rather improving on the demarcation criterion by Popper, who
wanted to distinguish empirical from non-empirical statements, both of which can be
meaningful (Popper 1935, §4; 1963, §II). I will follow Sober in the search for a demarcation
criterion for empirical statements, but not in his choice of terminology. I think that
‘empirical significance’ differs from ‘meaningfulness’ enough to avoid confusion, and, as a
technical term, is clearly meant as a placeholder for a concept that is yet to be explicated.
2.1 Falsifiability
In line with his search for a demarcation criterion, Sober (2007; 2008, §2.8) introduces
his criterion as avoiding the problems of Popper’s falsifiability criterion. Popper’s criterion
demands that, together with some initial conditions, “the theory allow us to deduce,
roughly speaking, more empirical singular statements than we can deduce from the initial
conditions alone” (Popper 1935, 85). By application of modus tollens, and assuming that
the negation of an observation sentence is itself an observation sentence, Popper (1935,
86) arrives at the following definition:
A theory is to be called ‘empirical’ or ‘falsifiable’ if it divides the class of all
possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty
subclasses. First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is incon-
sistent [ . . . ]; and secondly, the class of those basic statements which it does
not contradict [ . . . ].
Since Popper allows the use of auxiliary assumptions for the derivation of observation
sentences (cf. Lakatos 1974, 106f), possible basic statements (‘observation sentences’ in
the following) are those observation sentences compatible with the auxiliary assumptions.
This leads to
Definition 1. A theory H is falsifiable relative to auxiliary assumptions A if and only if there
is an observation sentence O with A 6 ¬O such that O ∧ A ¬H.2
2I will follow Sober in treating observational claims and theories as single sentences, and the auxiliary
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Here and in the following I will assume that for all theories H and auxiliary assumptions
A it holds that Pr(H∧A)> 0, and thus specifically that H and A are compatible (H∧A 6⊥).
Therefore, H∧A must be compatible with some observation sentence, for otherwise it would
entail negations of all observation sentences. Assuming with Popper that the negation
of an observation sentence is itself an observation sentence, H ∧ A would thus entail all
observation sentences and their negations, that is, be inconsistent. Thus definition 1
captures Popper’s formulation.
One problem with falsifiability, Sober (2008, 130, cf. 151) notes, is that no purely
probabilistic statement is falsifiable: “Consider a simple example: the statement that a coin
has a probability of .5 of landing heads each time it is tossed [ . . . ] is testable, but it does
not satisfy Popper’s criterion”. To avoid this result, Popper (1935, ch. VIII) generalizes his
criterion, considering a theory H falsified even if an event occurs that is possible but very
improbable according to H∧A. But this generalization runs into problems as well, the most
important of which is, for the sequel, the following: If a theory implies an observation
sentence, then it allows a deductive inference via modus ponens, ‘{X , X → Y }  Y ’: The
assumption of the theory X and the fact that it implies Y entail Y . Popper justifies his
criterion of falsifiability by using the implication of an observation sentence in a modus
tollens, ‘{¬Y, X → Y }  ¬X ’. The justification of the probabilistic generalization of his
criterion would thus have to rely on a probabilistic version of modus tollens, in which a
theory X is false or at the very least improbable if Pr(Y |X ) is high and Y is false. But as
Sober (2002, 69f) points out (cf. Sober 2008, §1.4):
There is a “smooth [t]ransition” between probabilistic and deductive modus
ponens; the minor premiss (“X ”) either ensures that Y is true, or makes Y very
probable, depending on how the major premiss is formulated. In contrast,
there is a radical discontinuity between probabilistic and deductive modus
tollens. The minor premiss (“not-Y ”) guarantees that X is false in the one case,
but has no implications whatever about the probability of X in the other.
Therefore, while Popper is right to infer from the fact that a theory entails an observation
sentence that the theory is falsifiable, he cannot infer the same from the fact that it assigns
a high probability to an observation sentence (and thus a low probability to the sentence’s
negation). Thus the generalization of falsifiability to probabilistic theories has not been
justified.
assumptions as a finite set thereof. Finite sets of sentences are identified with the conjunctions of their
members. Mostly, the restriction to single sentences—in effect a restriction to finite axiomatizations—is
only a matter of notational convenience; I will note whenever it is essential. To allow sets of sentences and
higher order logic in the definition of falsifiability, it must be phrased as “A theory H is falsifiable relative to
assumptions A if and only if there is a set Ω of observation sentences with Ω∪A 6⊥ such that Ω∪H ∪A⊥”,
where A and H are sets of sentences and ⊥ is some contradiction.
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2.2 Bayesian empirical significance
A more successful criterion of empirical significance for probabilistic theories has been
suggested within Bayesianism, the position that non-deductive inferences should follow
the rules of the probability calculus, and specifically that the confirmation of scientific
theories should follow Bayes’s theorem,
Pr(H |O ∧ A) = Pr(O |H ∧ A) · Pr(H |A)
Pr(O |H ∧ A) · Pr(O |¬H ∧ A) . (1)
Pr(H |A) is the probability of the theory given only the auxiliary assumptions, that is,
before the observation O is taken into account, and thus called the prior probability (of
H). Pr(H |O ∧ A) is the probability of H after O is taken into account, and hence called
the posterior probability.3 Pr(O |H ∧ A) and Pr(O |¬H ∧ A) are the likelihoods of H and
¬H, respectively (for O). The standard criterion of empirical significance suggested within
Bayesianism is the following (cf. Sober 2008, 150):
Definition 2. Observations are relevant for theory H relative to auxiliary assumptions A if
and only if there is an observation sentence O such that4
Pr(H |O ∧ A) 6= Pr(H |A) . (2)
Sober (2008, 150, 24–30) argues that if H is, say, the theory of general relativity, it is
well-nigh impossible to assign a probability to H, or assess the likelihood of ¬H, so that
Pr(H |A), Pr(O |¬H ∧ A), and Pr(H |O ∧ A) are often undefined. Bayes theorem (1) then
becomes unusable, and definition 2 very questionable.
3 Sober’s criterion of empirical significance
3.1 A precise formulation
Sober (2008, 152) suggests a criterion of empirical significance that avoids all of the
problems discussed so far. Unlike falsifiability, his criterion does not render all probabilistic
theories empirically non-significant and does not rely on a faulty probabilistic generaliza-
tion of modus tollens for its justification; unlike the Bayesian criterion, it does not rely
on the probabilities of whole theories or on likelihoods of the negations of theories. The
criterion is the following:5
3Sober (2008, 8) calls Pr(H) the prior and Pr(H |O) the posterior probability and discusses Bayesianism
without auxiliary assumptions. But he also argues that Pr(O |H), which would be used to determine Pr(H |O),
is, unlike Pr(O |H ∧ A), almost never defined. Prior and posterior probabilities therefore have to be defined
relative to auxiliary assumptions, lest Bayesianism be empty.
4I will always silently assume that for any occurring conditional probability Pr(B |C), Pr(C) 6= 0.
5Here and in the following quotations, I will replace Sober’s ‘&’ by ‘∧’.
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Hypothesis H1 can now be tested against hypothesis H2 if and only if there
exist true auxiliary assumptions A and an observation statement O such that
(i) Pr(O|H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O|H2 ∧ A), (ii) we now are justified in believing A, and
(iii) the justification we now have for believing A does not depend on believing
that H1 is true or that H2 is true and also does not depend on believing that O
is true (or that it is false).
Sober (2008, 151) remarks that the “word ‘now’ marks the fact that whether a proposi-
tion has observational implications depends on the rest of what we are justified in believing,
and that can change”. However, the use of the indexical ‘now’ does not define testability
relative to time in general, but relative to the specific time of the utterance. Thus ‘H1 can
now be tested against H2’ is defined, but ‘H1 will be testable against H2 within a decade’
is not. ‘Within a decade, the utterance “H1 can now be tested against H2” will be true’,
on the other hand, is defined. To avoid such cumbersome formulations, one can define
contrastive testability as the three-place predicate ‘H1 can at time t be tested against H2’.
This achieves Sober’s intention more explicitly.
The other indexical term, ‘we’, occurs only in the definiens, so that Sober’s criterion is
not a definition but rather a claim—and a false one at that. This is because the criterion
violates the demand that in an explicit definition, any free variable of the definiens must
also occur free in the definiendum, and thus Sober’s criterion is creative (cf. Belnap 1993,
139): If for two theories H1 and H2, one referent of ‘we’ fulfills the definiens at t, the
definiendum applies to H1 and H2 at t. But then the definiendum applies to H1 and H2
at t no matter the referent of ‘we’, and thus any referent fulfills the definiens for H1 and
H2 at t. Hence according to Sober’s criterion, it holds for any O, H1, H2, and A that fulfill
(i): If one group is justified in believing A independently of H1, H2, O, and ¬O, then every
group is.6 To avoid this unintended implication, testability must be defined as both relative
to time and relative to a group of people. It is thus as a four-place predicate.
As it stands, restriction (iii) on the auxiliary assumptions sounds like the demand
that the justification of A must not depend on the fact that the truth of H1, H2, O or ¬O is
content of our beliefs. But very few statements are justified by the having of a belief, so
that condition (iii) would be almost empty if this was meant. The restriction is therefore
probably better expressed as the demand that the justifications for A must not depend
on the fact that the belief in the truth of H1, H2, O or ¬O is justified. For convenience, I
will mostly drop the reference to beliefs in the following, and speak of justified sentences,
rather than justified beliefs in the truth of propositions expressed by sentences.
Finally, the condition (i) on the likelihoods of H1 and H2 needs to be elucidated, given
that Sober’s critique of the Bayesian criterion of empirical significance assumes that some
6Keeping Sober’s indexical formulation, it holds for any O, H1, H2, and A that fulfill (i): If for one group
the claim ‘We are now justified in believing A independently of H1, H2, O, and ¬O’ is true, then the claim is
true for every group.
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likelihoods are undefined. Prima facie, one would expect that H1 and H2 cannot be tested
against each other if and only if Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) for all O and A that fulfill
conditions (ii) and (iii). But this would mean that the lack of testability is transitive for any
theories that are not used to justify their own or each other’s auxiliary assumptions. And
this is incompatible with Sober’s remark that it is not clear that ID “can be tested against
the Epicurean hypothesis that a mindless chance process gave vertebrates their eyes (or,
for that matter, against the evolutionary hypothesis that the process of evolution by natural
selection did the work)” (Sober 2008, 148). Assuming that the chance hypothesis can be
tested against evolutionary theory (ET), if ID cannot be tested against either, the lack of
testability is not transitive. The solution to this puzzle is that Sober (2010, 2f) interprets
the inequality as true if and only if both likelihoods are defined and different. This
interpretation, however, plays havoc with classical logic, for p 6= q  ¬ p = q. Therefore, if
the likelihoods p and q are defined and different, while the likelihood a is undefined, it
follows from Sober’s interpretation of the inequality that p = a and a = q, while p 6= q. To
avoid such inconsistencies, it is probably best to treat undefined likelihoods separately in
the definition.
These considerations lead to
Definition 3 (Contrastive testability). Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 if and
only if there are auxiliary assumptions A and an observation sentence O such that
(I) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) are defined,
(II) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A),
(III) A is justified, and
(IV) the justification of A
a) does not depend on H1 or H2 being justified and
b) does not depend on O or ¬O being justified.
One could reformulate definition 3 to include a reference to times and groups of people,
that is, define ‘H1 can be tested against H2 at time t by group g ’ by relativizing ‘justification’
(and possibly ‘dependence’) to t and g. In similar cases, especially when the auxiliary
assumptions are simply the background assumptions, these relativizations are typically
suppressed because it is clear that the background assumptions and generally the set of
justified sentences can change over time and from group to group. Thus I will do likewise.
Sober calls his criterion simply ‘testability’, but the qualifier ‘contrastive’ distinguishes it
clearly from the ordinary language term and emphasizes that, atypically, the empirical sig-
nificance of one theory is defined relative to another. It may seem problematic to explicate
a one-place predicate like ‘makes observational assertions’ by a two-place predicate like
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contrastive testability. Frege (1918, 291), for example, objects to the explication of ‘truth’
as a correspondence relation on the grounds that the first is a one-place, the second a
two-place predicate. However, many successful explications involve a change of the logical
structure, as the explication of ‘warm’ by ‘warmer than’ and finally ‘temperature’ illustrates
(Carnap 1950, §4). Hempel (1952, §10) even argues that the move from a classificatory to
a comparative concept is often a sign of an investigation’s maturity and, at another point,
argues that empirical significance is comparative (Hempel 1965, 117).
3.2 Interpreting inequalities between probabilities
In the discussion of Sober’s interpretation of the inequality in his criterion (§3.1), it has
already become apparent that dealing with undefined probabilities is not an entirely
straightforward matter. And even though definition 4 treats the case of undefined likeli-
hoods explicitly, it still involves some lacunae. Specifically, if one of the likelihoods is not
defined, it is not obvious how to treat the inequality (4), and not entirely obvious how to
treat the whole definition. For the definition is logically a conjunction with the inequality
as a conjunct, and it is unclear whether a conjunction with one undefined conjunct is
undefined as well. It would thus be desirable if the inequality were never undefined, so
that the usual rules of logic can apply. Luckily, Sober’s assumptions arguably entail just
such an interpretation of the inequality.
It is uncontentious that Pr(S |H) is defined when H assigns a real-valued probability
to S. But as Sober himself states when arguing for the need for auxiliary assumptions,
theories alone often do not assert anything, and thus do not assign a real-valued probability
to any observation sentence. And even with auxiliary assumptions A, no theory will make
assertions about everything.7 Rather, H ∧ A restricts the set of reals from the unit interval
that can be assigned to some sentences S to a subset of the unit interval, possibly to one
specific value x ∈ [0, 1], while the set of reals for some sentences will remain unrestricted.
The conditional probability Pr(S |H ∧ A) can then either always be read as the set of reals
that S can be assigned under the assumption of H ∧A, from [0, 1] to proper subsets thereof
down to the singleton set {x}, x ∈ [0,1]. Or Pr(S |H ∧ A) may be read as defined only
when it is a set of some specific kind considered acceptable (e. g., an proper sub-interval of
[0, 1] or a singleton set), and undefined in all other cases.
Depending on the treatment of formulas that contain undefined terms, the second
reading of conditional probabilities leads to different interpretations of the inequality (4),
given in table 1. Sober seems to assume the validity of classical logic, so that ¬ϕ is false if
and only if ϕ is true and tautologies are always true. This excludes some of the possible
7More precisely: For any even remotely plausible theory H, H ∧ A can be observationally complete only
for very restricted languages, where H is observationally complete if and only if for all observations O,
Pr(O |H ∧ A) = x , x ∈ [0, 1]. It is thus always possible to expand the language by well-interpreted observation
terms so that H fails to be observationally complete.
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Values of likelihoods Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A)
Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
x y T . . .
x x F . . .
x U T T T F F F U U U
U U T F U T F U T F U
Table 1: The nine possible interpretations of the inequality in definition 6 depending on the values of the
probabilities, where x , y with x 6= y are acceptable values for likelihoods, ‘T ’ stands for ‘true’, ‘F ’ stands for
‘false’, and ‘U ’ stands for ‘undefined’.
interpretations: Considering again the case where p and q are defined and different, while
a is undefined, it is clear that interpretations 4–6 (5 being Sober’s) are inconsistent because
they lead to p = a, a = q, and p 6= q. When a is undefined, interpretations 1, 3, 7, and 9
do not render a 6= a false, and thus they are also excluded. Interpretation 8 is excluded
if one demands that classical logic be truth-preserving and at least one disjunct of a true
disjunction be true. For then, if p and q are defined and identical, while a and b are
undefined, p = q and a = b are true, and entail a = p ∨ b 6= q, which according to
interpretation 8 has two undefined disjuncts. The remaining interpretation 2 can be seen
as following from the introduction of the special value ‘undefined’ for probability-terms.
Under these assumptions, there are thus two possible interpretations of the inequality:
1. When all sets of reals are acceptable, the inequality is true if and only if the two sets
differ. Otherwise, it is false.
2. When some sets of reals are unacceptable, the inequality is true if and only if its
two sides are defined and different, or one side is defined and the other one is not.
Otherwise, the inequality is false.
It is clear that the inequality is true more often for interpretation 1 than for interpretation 2,
since in interpretation 1 it is true whenever the set on one side differs from the set on
the other side, but also when there is a difference between two sets that are unacceptable
under the second reading of the likelihoods. It is also clear that Sober does not subscribe
to interpretation 1, since in that case, there are no undefined likelihoods. In fact, he
developed his concept of contrastive testability under the assumption that only singleton
sets are acceptable (Sober 2010, 3).
With these two readings of probability and the corresponding interpretations of the
inequality, definition 3 is now indeed defined in all cases because the inequality is always
either true or false.
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4 The restrictions on the auxiliary assumptions
Definition 3 is formally correct, but is nonetheless problematic. Specifically, I will argue
that there are serious problems with the restrictions (IVa) and (IVb) that Sober places on
the auxiliary assumptions.
Sober (1999, 54) introduces auxiliary assumptions into the definition because “hypothe-
ses rarely make observational predictions on their own; they require supplementation by
auxiliary assumptions if they are to be tested” (cf. Sober 2007, 5f; Sober 2008, 144).8 But
this “raises the question of which auxiliary assumptions we should use to render a theory
testable. What makes an auxiliary assumption ‘suitable’?” (Sober 2008, 144). Restrictions
(IVa) and (IVb) are answers to these questions.
4.1 Dependence on the theories
Sober (2008, 145) at one point simply states that the need for restriction (IVa) is obvious,
and elaborates in another passage that without it, his criterion would beg the question
(Sober 2007, 6). But this, at least, is not obvious. Arguments must not in general allow
their conclusion among their premises (that is, beg the question) because otherwise every
claim could be shown to be true, and the concept of an argument would be trivial. But even
without restriction (IVa), it is not possible to simply assume that H1 can be tested against
H2 when the criterion is applied. In fact, I want to show that (IVa) is often ineffective or
redundant, and in general lacks a justification.
There are a number of cases in which restriction (IVa) is ineffective. Obviously, two
theories that are not contrastively testable without (IVa) cannot be contrastively testable
with (IVa). For if there are no auxiliary assumptions A that fulfill (IVb), there are also no
auxiliary assumptions that fulfill (IVb) and (IVa). And the converse usually also holds:
Two theories that are contrastively testable without (IVa) cannot fail to be so with (IVa).
It is typical, for example, that (i) theories H1 and H2 are incompatible, and (ii) the
auxiliary assumptions used to determine the likelihoods of H1 at most depend on H1,
not on the competing theory H2 (and vice versa). Now, for restriction (IVa) to do any
work, there has to be an observation O such that there are no auxiliary assumptions
that fulfill conditions (I)–(IV), but there are justified auxiliary assumptions A that fulfill
restriction (IVb), Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H1 ∧ A), and both likelihoods are defined. By
assumption (ii), the auxiliary assumptions are of the form A  A1 ∧ A2, where A1 does
not depend on H2 and A2 does not depend on H1. Thus H1 → A1 and H2 → A2 are
justified without assuming H1 or H2. Therefore, A
′ := (H1 → A1) ∧ (H2 → A2) fulfils
restriction (IVa), and since by assumption (i), H1 ∧ A′  H1 ∧ A and H2 ∧ A′  H2 ∧ A,
8Since Sober does not use ‘prediction’ to refer exclusively to claims about the future, I will treat it as
synonymous with ‘assertion’.
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Pr(O |H1 ∧ A′) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A′) so that H1 can be tested against H2.9
That restriction (IVa) is often ineffective is unproblematic however, because it is also
redundant in the important cases. To see this, note that restriction (III) demands that A
be justified, and that a sentence whose justification depends on another sentence B be
justified only if B is justified. (Giving up this relation between ‘justified’ and ‘depend’ would
render Sober’s restriction (IV) altogether empty.) Thus an auxiliary assumption whose
justification depends on H1 fulfills the definiens of definition 3 only if H1 itself is justified,
and analogously for H2. Typically, however, the question of empirical significance does
not even come up for theories that are already justified. Indeed, Sober assumes that a
theory is confirmed only if it has been tested, and this is possible only if it is contrastively
testable. Assuming that only confirmed theories are justified, restriction (IVa) therefore
goes beyond restriction (III) only when the question of empirical significance has already
been answered.10
This general argument is not countered by the example that Sober (2008, 145) adduces
to show the need for restriction (IVa). In it, he envisions Jones being tried for a murder,
with a size 12 shoe print, cigar ash, and .45 Colt shells found at the crime scene. When
considering whether Smith may be the culprit instead, Sober notes, one must not simply
conclude that the evidence favors Smith over Jones on the basis of the assumption that
Smith is a Colt-owning smoker with size 12 feet, while Jones is not.
First note that in this example the question is which theory can be inferred from the
evidence, not which observations are asserted by the theory; that is, the example revolves
around a question of confirmation, not empirical significance. More important in the
following is that the belief about Smith’s shoe size would be excluded from the auxiliary
assumptions even without restriction (IVa). This is because, first, the belief that Smith
is the murderer (H1) is itself not justified, and thus cannot justify anything. Second,
Smith’s murdering someone does not allow to conclude anything about her shoe size. This
conclusion also requires the belief that there was a size 12 shoe print at the crime scene
(O). In other words, the justification of the auxiliary assumption cannot depend on H1, for
then it would be excluded from A by restriction (III), and it is excluded by restriction (IVb)
anyway, because its justification depends on O.
Restriction (IVa) is included in definition 3 for more serious reasons than fictitious
murder trials with careless jurors. It is meant to address an argument in defense of the
contrastive testability of ID against evolutionary theory (ET) that Sober (1999, 65, note
and line break removed) describes as follows (cf. Sober 2008, 143–146):
[A]dvocates of the design argument should not be confident that they know
9This inference assumes that H1, H2, A1, and A2 can be finitely axiomatized. The assumption can be
somewhat alleviated by splitting A into A∗ ∪ {A1} ∪ {A2}, where A∗ does not depend on either H1 or H2 and
can be infinite. Then A′ can be defined as A∗ ∪ {H1→ A1} ∪ {H2→ A2}.
10Of course, one may want to justify or confirm an already justified or confirmed theory further, but this is
then not a question of contrastive testability any more.
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what characteristics God would have wanted to give to organisms on earth if
he had created them. Creationists may be tempted to respond to this challenge
simply by inspecting the life we see around us and saying that God wanted
to create that. After all, if life is the result of God’s blueprint, can’t we infer
what the blueprint said by seeing what the resulting edifice looks like? [But
you] can’t just assume that God created organisms, and you also can’t assume
that if God created organisms he would have made them with such-and-such
characteristics.
Analogously to the murder trial, the justification of the auxiliary assumption about God’s
intentions in the creationists’ argument depends both on the assumption that God exists
and the observational assumption that life is as we see it around us, like “that”.11 Therefore
it is excluded from A by restriction (III) because it is not justified until the belief in God
is justified. And if a description of life as we see it around us is given as the observation
sentence O for which the likelihoods of ID and ET differ, then the auxiliary assumption is
also excluded by restriction (IVb) for dependence on O.
4.2 Dependence on observation sentences
Sober (2008, 145) justifies restriction (IVb) as follows (cf. Sober 2007, 6):
If O is true, so is the disjunction “either H1 is false or O is true”. If you use
this disjunction as your auxiliary assumption A1, then it turns out that the
conjunction H1 ∧ A1 entails O. This allows H1 to make a prediction about O
even when H1 has nothing at all to do with O. The same ploy can be used to
obtain auxiliary assumptions A2 so that the conjunction H2 ∧ A2 also entails O.
Using propositions A1 and A2 as auxiliary assumptions leads to the conclusion
that the two hypotheses H1 and H2 both have likelihoods of unity.
As it stands, this argument proves nothing about the relevance of restriction (IVb) for
the definition of contrastive testability, since it only shows that for one specific auxiliary
assumption, A  A1 ∧ A2, both theories’ likelihoods are 1. But to show that H1 cannot
be tested against H2, their likelihoods have to be identical for all auxiliary assumptions
that fulfill restrictions (III) and (IVa). (Furthermore, if the goal was to arrive at the same
likelihood for both theories, A O would achieve the same result.)
But the ingenuity of the choice of A1 is exactly that, if H1 and H2 are completely
unrelated to O, the likelihood of H1 ∧ A1 is 1, while the likelihood of H2 ∧ A1 is not.
Reconceptualized in this way, Sober’s case for restriction (IVb) is a typical trivialization
proof, since it shows that without it, any two theories can be tested against each other.
11In disanalogy to the murder trial, the question in this case is indeed which observations the theory asserts,
not which theory the observations confirm.
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The argument has four tacit assumptions, however. First, a sentence S (here: ¬H1 ∨O)
logically entailed by a justified sentence J (here: O) is also justified, since otherwise S
might be excluded by restriction (III). Second, S depends for its justification only on J , for
otherwise, S might be excluded by restriction (IVa) or, implausibly, for its dependence on
¬O by restriction (IVb). Third, Pr O |H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨O) 6= 1. Finally, Pr O |H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨O)
must be defined, for otherwise condition (I) is not fulfilled.
The fourth tacit assumption is probably false, since neither H1 nor H2 are related
to O. By considering additional auxiliary assumptions A, however, one can arrive at a
modification of the proof that has plausible premises. Let A be such that it is unrelated
to H1 and H2, and Pr(O |A) is defined. Then a plausible fourth tacit assumption is that
for any S unrelated to H1 and H2, Pr(O |H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨ S)∧ A) is therefore defined as well:
Conjoining H2 with A does not render the conditional probability of O undefined, since
H2 is not related to O. Conjoining ¬H1 ∨ S with H2 ∧ A arguably does not render the
conditional probability of O undefined, either, because the inferences one can draw from
H1∨S are weaker then those that one can draw from H1, and H1 is already unrelated to O.
Choosing S = O and incorporating A in all premises now allows to give a corrected version
of Sober’s proof, which can also be recovered from the proof of claim 1 below.
Sober does not show why the reference to ¬O in restriction (IVb) is necessary, but his
trivialization proof can be repeated for ¬O. Since Pr(O |Hi ∧ A) = 1− Pr(¬O |Hi ∧ A), i ∈{1,2}, A can be justified with O, while the likelihoods of H1 and H2 would differ for ¬O.
This proof assumes that the negation of an observation sentence is itself an observation
sentence, which is fairly uncontroversial. It is not only tacitly assumed by Popper and
Sober (e. g. 1999, n. 14), but also fulfilled by the most common restrictions on observation
sentences: It holds if all and only sentences with a specific non-logical vocabulary are
observational (cf. Psillos 2000, 158f), if all and only molecular sentences with a specific
vocabulary are observational (cf. Carnap 1937, §23), and if all and only sentences are
observational whose quantifiers are relativized to observable objects (cf. Carnap 1956,
§II; Friedman 1982, 276f). A sentence could also be considered observational if and only
if it is about observations, and according to Lewis (1988, 140f), if a sentence is about
observations, so is its negation. All these restrictions even entail that the set of observation
sentences is closed under truth-functional composition.
While restriction (IVb) is necessary to avoid trivialization of definition 3, it is not
sufficient. Specifically, any two theories can be tested against each other as long as one
of them can be finitely axiomatized and thus phrased as one (possibly inordinately long)
sentence:12
Claim 1. Let H1 and H2 be theories and O, S, and A be any sentences such that
1. O is an observation sentence,
12Since the proof relies on the use of the negation of one of the theories, this restriction is essential.
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2. S  O,
3. S and A are justified independently of O, ¬O, H1, and H2,
4. S and A are unrelated to H1 and H2,
5. Pr(O |A) is defined, and
6. Pr(O |H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ A) 6= 1.
Given Sober’s tacit assumptions, H1 and H2 can then be tested against each other.
Proof. Choose O, S, and A such that conditions 1–6 hold. Since S and A are justified, so
is A∗  (¬H1 ∨ S) ∧ A by Sober’s first tacit assumption. It follows from Sober’s second
tacit assumption that, since the justifications of S and A do not depend on O, ¬O, H1, or
H2, neither does the justification of A
∗. Therefore A∗ fulfills restrictions (III) and (IV) of
definition 3.
Now, from Pr(O |H2∧¬H1∧A) 6= 1 and S  O it follows that Pr O |H2∧(¬H1∨S)∧A 6=
1:
Pr
 
O |H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨ S)∧ A
=
Pr(O ∧H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ A) + Pr(O ∧H2 ∧ S ∧ A)− Pr(O ∧H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ S)
Pr(H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ A) + Pr(H2 ∧ S ∧ A)− Pr(H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ S ∧ A)
=
Pr(O ∧H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ A) + c
Pr(H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ A) + c . (3)
The last term equals 1 if and only if Pr
 
O |H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ A = 1. Since Pr(O |A) is defined,
Pr(O |H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨ S)∧ A)  Pr(O |H2 ∧ A∗) is defined by the fourth tacit assumption.
Since furthermore Pr(O |H1 ∧ A∗) = 1, it holds that Pr(O |H1 ∧ A∗) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A∗),
where both probabilities are defined. H1 and H2 can therefore be tested against each
other.
Note that for Pr(H1 ∧ H2 ∧ A) = 0, condition 6 simplifies to ‘Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) 6= 1’. The
corrected version of the trivialization proof that Sober uses to justify restriction (IVb) can
be recovered by dropping S in condition 3 and choosing S = O. Then condition 2 is trivially
true, 3 amounts to Sober’s restriction (IV), 4 and 5 are the antecedents of the fourth tacit
assumption, and 6 is equivalent to the third tacit assumption.
Conditions 1–3 are impossible to fulfill if a justification can proceed only deductively
from observation sentences, because then the justification of a sentence depends on every
observation sentence it entails. However, since Sober’s criterion is meant to be applicable to
inductive theories, it is plausible that auxiliary assumptions can also be inductively justified.
In that case, it is easy to find sentences O, S, and A that fulfill all the requirements. For
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instance, let A express that 1 out of 10 vases of some kind breaks when dropped from a
specific height. Let furthermore S express that a specific vase of that kind does not break
when dropped a hundred times from a that height, and O express that the vase does not
break on the hundredth drop. Then S is justified independently of O when the vase is
dropped 99 times without breaking, so that O, S, and A fulfill conditions 1–6 for any two
theories that are not related to vases. Since according to Sober (1999, 54), “hypotheses
rarely make observational predictions on their own”, that includes almost all theories. But
even for two theories that make assertions about vases, it should not be difficult to find
other observations that neither they nor their negations assert with probability 1, but that
can be asserted by enumerative induction.
Considering the somewhat problematic status of the fourth tacit assumption, the result
of this section can be seen as a dilemma: Either the tacit assumptions (especially the
fourth) hold or they do not hold. If they do not hold, Sober’s restriction (IVb) has not been
justified. If they do, the restriction is to weak to avoid trivialization.
4.3 New definitions
Sober’s restriction (IVa) is unjustified where it is not redundant or ineffective, and re-
strictions (III) and (IV) together are to weak to avoid trivialization. Clearly, the search
for general restrictions on the auxiliary assumptions poses a host of subtle problems. To
bracket these problems, I suggest
Definition 4. Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 relative to auxiliary assumptions A
if and only if there exists an observation sentence O such that Pr(O |H1∧A) and Pr(O |H2∧A)
are defined and
Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) . (4)
This definition is not trivial: Choose A = ∅, two non-observational, non-equivalent
sentences S and S′, and, for some observation sentence O, H1  S ∧ Pr(O) = p and
H2  S′ ∧ Pr(O) = q for some probabilities p and q. Then H1 and H2 are never equivalent,
and H1 can be contrastively tested against H2 if and only if p 6= q, so that many contingent
theories can and many contingent theories cannot be tested against each other relative
to A. Definition 4 makes it necessary, however, to decide on a case by case basis which
auxiliary assumptions are suitable. This may be a good preliminary strategy, because often
the suitable auxiliary assumptions are reasonably clear. For instance, often the suitable
auxiliary assumptions are those that could feature as background assumptions.
Eventually, of course, it would be helpful to have a general criterion for suitable
auxiliary assumptions and define absolute contrastive testability as contrastive testability
relative to suitable auxiliary assumptions. To this end, I suggest the following. The proof of
claim 1 is a modification of a trivialization proof for Sober’s criterion of ‘having observable
implications’ (Lutz 2010, §9.2) and leads to a similar diagnosis. Sober’s proof and that
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of claim 1 rely on the possibility to include a sentence (¬H1 ∨O or ¬H1 ∨ S) in A that is
justified by another one (O or S) that is itself not included in A. Both trivialization proofs
can therefore be blocked by explicating ‘suitable auxiliary assumptions’ as ‘honest set of
auxiliary assumptions’:
Definition 5. A is an honest set if and only if every S ∈ A is a justified sentence, and A also
contains every sentence on which the justification of S depends.
Note that this definition only uses concepts that already occur in Sober’s definition 3 of
contrastive testability and that A can be a proper subset of the set of all justified sentences.
Arguably, an honest set is a set of sentences that, for all we know, could have been our
set of background assumptions: It describes which set of justified beliefs we hold now (if
A is simply the set of all our currently justified beliefs), or which set we could have held
before we got to hold all our current justified beliefs. The subjunctive here excludes false
starts, that is, beliefs that at one point were justified but later became unjustified. This
is plausible, as it is of little interest whether a theory is empirically significant under the
assumption that the world is different from the way it in fact is (as far as we know). In
this sense, an honest set is one step in the accumulation of our currently justified beliefs.
Definition 5 allows to modify Sober’s criterion of testability as follows:
Definition 6. Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 if and only if H1 can be tested
against H2 relative to an honest set of auxiliary assumptions.
To distinguish definition 6 from definition 4 more clearly, I will sometimes also speak
of absolute contrastive testability.
The proof that relative testability is not trivial also shows that not any two theories
are absolutely testable against each other, for ∅ is an honest set according to definition 5.
I will not attempt to prove that there is a non-falsifiable sentence, because this would
amount to finding two theories that are not contrastively testable relative to any honest set.
The proof is immediate for equivalent theories, but impossible for other pairs of theories
without more precise notions of justification and dependence.13
Definition 6 is at least as exclusive as Sober’s definition 3, however. The restriction of
the auxiliary assumptions in definition 6 to honest sets entails restriction (III) of definition 3.
And while the restriction to honest sets does not entail restriction (IVb), it precludes all
trivializations precluded by that restriction: Two theories H1 and H2 fail to be contrastively
testable because of restriction (IVb) only if for any S whose inclusion in A would lead
to differing likelihoods for some O, the justification of S depends on O or ¬O. In that
case, (IVb) ensures that H1 and H2 are not contrastively testable. The restriction of A to
honest sets leads to the same result, because if the justification of S depends on O (or
13Equivalent theories are excluded from the conclusion of claim 1 because of premise 6 and the assumption
that for any conditional probability Pr(B |C), Pr(C) 6= 0 (see n. 4).
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¬O) and A is honest, then O ∈ A (or ¬O ∈ A). Thus P(O |H1 ∧ A) = 1 = P(O |H2 ∧ A) (or
P(O |H1∧A) = 0 = P(O |H2∧A)). As an example, take the sentence (¬H1∨O)∧A of Sober’s
trivialization proof. Restriction (IVb) excludes (¬H1∨O)∧A from the auxiliary assumptions
A∗, so that the likelihoods of H1 and H2 for O cannot differ because of (¬H1 ∨O)∧ A. The
restriction to honest sets, on the other hand, leads to the inclusion of O in A∗, so that the
likelihoods do not differ, either. Unlike restriction (IVb), the restriction to honest sets also
leads to identical likelihoods if (¬H1 ∨ S)∧ A∈ A∗ is justified by a sentence S  O, thereby
precluding the proof of claim 1. Specifically, premise 6 will be false because A∗  O.
Since it is not clear in which case restriction (IVa) is meant to preclude trivialization,
or in general, which problem it is meant to solve, I cannot show that definition 5 can
fulfill the role of restriction (IVa). Given the restriction’s questionable role and justification,
this should not be considered a drawback of definition 6. If there is a justification for
restriction (IVa), however, one can modify definition 6 by defining contrastive testability
as contrastive testability relative to an honest set that does not include H1 or H2. This
restriction entails restriction (IVa).
That the notion of an honest set plausibly explicates the notion of possible background
assumptions provides a justification of definition 6 that is independent of the trivialization
proofs: If relative contrastive testability is a good explication of empirical significance, then
absolute contrastive testability explicates what it means for a theory to be empirically sig-
nificant in our current epistemic situation (as determined by our background assumptions)
or a possible situation on our way to our current epistemic situations.
The independent justification of definition is not only relevant because the proof
of claim 1 rests, like Sober’s justification of restriction (IVb), on somewhat contentious
assumptions. More importantly, it justifies the hope that the definition is right, while the
amendments in light of the trivialization proofs at best allow to claim that the modified
definitions are not obviously wrong. Of course, definition 6 might still allow the proof that
any two non-equivalent theories can be absolutely tested against each other. In response to
such a proof, one can fall back on definition 4 until a better explication of ‘suitable’ is found
than definition 5. In general, any results that determine which auxiliary assumptions are
suitable, or which assumptions are possible background assumptions, can be used directly
as a substitute for definition 5 (cf. Lutz 2010, §9.2).
5 Conclusion
I have argued that Sober’s definition of contrastive testability is settled with a host of
problems: It entails that if one group of people is justified to hold some belief, all groups
of people are justified to hold that belief, and it rests on an inconsistent interpretation
of inequalities between likelihoods. Furthermore, one of its restrictions on the auxiliary
assumptions is almost always redundant, often ineffective, and has in general not been
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justified. Most importantly, the restrictions on the auxiliary assumptions are too weak,
leaving almost any to theories contrastively testable.
Considering these problems, the criteria for empirical significance that I suggest deviate
surprisingly little from Sober’s original definition. The definition of contrastive testability
relative to a set of auxiliary assumptions simply avoids the question which auxiliary
assumptions are suitable. The definition of contrastive testability simpliciter relies on the
notion of honest sets, and it avoids the problems discussed in connection with Sober’s
original definition. Both criteria retain the essential feature of Sober’s criterion, that
empirical significance is contrastive.
As argued in the beginning, it is not obviously a shortcoming that the criteria explicate
a concept usually considered to be classificatory as a two-place relation. It is plausible
that a comparative explication of empirical significance is helpful (Popper 1935, §33; Lutz
2010, §8.1). But unlike ‘warmer than’ and ‘more significant than’, contrastive testability is
symmetric: The definiens is invariant up to logical equivalence under exchange of H1 and
H2. Thus contrastive testability does not provide a means to decide which of two theories
is what could be called ‘more empirically significant’. And this may be a problem. What
is more, in some passages Sober himself uses ‘testability’ like a one-place predicate. For
instance, his claims that ‘Undetectable angels exist’ is untestable and that ‘This coin has
probability of .5 of landing heads’ is testable are, strictly speaking, meaningless according
to his own definition. And both claims are important for Sober’s line of argument, since
he relies on the first to argue that testability is different from meaningfulness, and on the
second to argue that falsifiability is not an adequate criterion of empirical significance.
Thus, even Sober seems to rely tacitly on a concept of empirical significance that is not
captured by contrastive testability.
With the suggested modifications, contrastive testability is consistently defined and,
arguably, non-trivial. But whether it is adequate as a criterion of empirical significance is
still an open question.
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